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For the London Stock Exchange we demonstrate that the signs of orders obey a long-memory
process. The autocorrelation function decays roughly as τ−α with α ≈ 0.6, corresponding to a
Hurst exponent H ≈ 0.7. This implies that the signs of future orders are quite predictable from
the signs of past orders; all else being equal, this would suggest a very strong market inefficiency.
We demonstrate, however, that fluctuations in order signs are compensated for by anti-correlated
fluctuations in transaction size and liquidity, which are also long-memory processes. This tends to
make the returns whiter. We show that some institutions display long-range memory and others
don’t.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Roughly speaking, a random process is said to have
long-memory if it has an autocorrelation function that is
not integrable. This happens, for example, when the au-
tocorrelation function decays asymptotically as a power
law of the form τ−α with α < 1. This is important be-
cause it implies that values from the distant past can have
a significant effect on the present, and implies anomalous
diffusion in a stochastic process whose increments have
long-memory. We present a more technical discussion of
long-memory processes in Section IV.
In this paper we make use of a data set from the
London Stock Exchange (LSE), which contains a full
record of individual orders and cancellations, to show
that stocks in the LSE display a remarkable long-memory
property1. We label each event as either a buy or a sell
order, and assign it ±1 accordingly. The autocorrelation
of the resulting time series shows a power law autocorre-
lation function, with exponents that are typically about
0.6, in the range 0.36 < α < 0.77. Positive autocorrela-
tion coefficients are seen at statistically significant levels
over lags of many thousand events, spanning many days.
Thus the memory of the market is remarkably long.
This immediately raises a conundrum concerning mar-
ket efficiency. All other things being equal, such strong
long-memory behavior would imply strong predictability
of the price return, easily exploitable for substantial prof-
its. How can this be compatible with market efficiency?
We show that this is at least partially solved by other
1 Bouchaud et al. (2004) independently discovered the long-
memory property of order signs for stocks in the Paris exchange.
We thank them for acknowledging the oral presentation of our
results in May 2003.
properties of the market adjusting in order to compen-
sate, making the market more efficient2. In particular,
the relative volume of buy and sell market orders, and
the relative buy and sell liquidity, are skewed in opposi-
tion to the imbalance in order signs. For example, sup-
pose the long-memory of previous order signs predicts
that buy market orders are more likely in the near fu-
ture. All things being equal, since buy market orders
have a positive price response, the price should go up.
But the market compensates for this: When buy orders
become more likely, the ratio of buy market order size
to the volume at the best ask tends to be smaller than
normal. This implies that the probability of a given buy
order penetrating the best price to trigger a positive price
change is smaller than normal. Similarly, the opposite is
true when sell orders are more likely. This is at least one
of the effects that contributes to keeping the price re-
turns roughly white. We demonstrate that market order
volume and liquidity are also long-memory processes; we
suggest this is because they are compensating for changes
in the predictability of order signs in order to keep the
market more efficient.
This brings up the interesting question of what ac-
tually causes these long-memory properties of markets.
While not answering this question, we provide a clue
about the answer by making use of the institutional codes
associated with each order. Some institutions show long-
memory quite clearly, while others do not.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section II we
present a brief summary of previous work on long-
memory processes in economics, and discuss our work
in the context of this literature. In Section III we give a
summary of the data set, and in Section IV we provide a
2 For a discussion of what we mean by “efficient”, see Section VI.
2more technical discussion of long-memory processes and
the statistical techniques we use in this paper. Then in
Section V we present the evidence that sequences of or-
der signs are long-memory processes, and in particular we
demonstrate that these series pass stringent tests so that
we can be sure that they are long-memory with a high
degree of confidence. In Section VI we show how other
processes compensate for the long-memory of order signs,
tending to keep price changes roughly efficient, and show
that both order size and liquidity are also long-memory
processes. In Section VII we break down the orders by
institution and show that the behavior of some institu-
tions shows long-memory quite clearly, while others do
not show it at all. In Section VIII we discuss the im-
plications of the long-memory properties of order flow
for delayed market impact. We conclude in Section IX,
discussing some of the broader issues and the remaining
questions.
II. LONG-MEMORY PROCESSES IN
ECONOMICS TIME SERIES
Long-memory processes have been observed in differ-
ent natural and human phenomena ranging from the
level of rivers to the temperature of the Earth (Beran,
1994). A good survey of the econometric approach to
long-memory is given in Baillie (1996). The range of ap-
plications of long-memory processes in economics spans
from macroeconomics to finance. In macroeconomics, for
example, Diebold and Rudebusch (1989) find evidence of
long-memory in the quarterly post World War II US real
GNP data. Even if several criticisms have been raised to
this work, subsequent analyses confirm the evidence of
long-memory properties of GNP data. Baillie, Chung and
Tieslau (1995) find that the monthly US Consumer Price
Index (CPI) inflation time series has long-memory prop-
erties. A related study by Hassler and Wolters (1995)
considers long-memory in inflation. Finally, Shea (1991)
and Backus and Zin (1993) find evidence of long-memory
in the context of the term structure of interest rates.
The study of possible long-memory properties of time
series in finance is even more widespread. There has
been a long-standing debate as to whether or not as-
set prices have long-memory properties. Several authors
have claimed that the time series of stock returns for
stock prices or indices display long-memory (Mandelbrot,
1971, Greene and Fielitz, 1977). More recently Lo (1991)
re-examined these results and showed that the statistical
R/S test used by Mandelbrot and Green and Fielitz is too
weak and unable to distinguish between long and short
memory (see also section IV and Campbell et al. 1997)).
By introducing a modified R/S test, Lo concluded that
daily stock returns do not display long-memory prop-
erties. This conclusion has been in turn criticized by
Willinger, Taqqu and Teverovsky (1999). These authors
showed with numerical simulations that the modified R/S
test leads to the rejection of the null hypothesis of short-
memory when applied to synthetic time series with a low
degree of long-memory. Since financial data tipically dis-
play low degree of long-memory, Willinger, Taqqu and
Teverovsky (1999) claim that the result of Lo is not con-
clusive. (We will not address this question).
It is more widely accepted (though still not entirely
uncontroversial) that the volatility of prices is a long-
memory process. Specifically Ding, Granger and Engle
(1993) and Breidt, Crato and de Lima (1993) find ev-
idence of long-memory stochastic volatility in stock re-
turns, and Harvey (1993) finds evidence for this in ex-
change rates. These results led to the development of
alternate models for volatility, such as FIGARCH. In
particular, Baillie, Bollerslev and Mikkelsen (1996) apply
the FIGARCH process to exchange rates, and Bollerslev
and Mikkelsen (1996) apply FIEGARCH, a modification
of FIGARCH, to stock prices. Another market property
that seems to have long-memory properties is stock mar-
ket trading volume (Lobato and Velasco, 2000). Mod-
els of long-memory processes include fractional Brownian
noise (Mandelbrot and van Ness, 1968) and the ARFIMA
process introduced by Granger and Joyeux (1980) and
Hosking (1981).
In this paper we discover and study the long-memory
properties of the signs of orders in a financial market.
Despite the ubiquity of long-memory processes in eco-
nomic time series described above, our result is, to our
knowledge, the first demonstration of the presence of
long-memory in a “microscopic” time series, i.e. a time
series which is not the result of the aggregation of many
individual events (such as the price return). Because of
the rapid timescale, we have a large amount of data, and
we are able to demonstrate the existence of long-memory
properties with a very high degree of confidence. The
order flow is a time series describing the action of trad-
ing institutions, i.e. it is an input to the price formation
mechanism. From this point of view it is very interest-
ing to see how the market responds to the existence of a
highly predictable long-memory input, to form prices so
as to maintain market efficiency. Because we are able to
see the detailed state of the orderbook, we can study how
bids, offers, and order volumes adjust to compensate, so
that the long-memory properties of order signs and vol-
umes are cancelled in the directional movements of prices.
We investigate the order flow mainly in event time. This
means that one time step is defined by the placement of
an order of a given type (market order, limit order and
cancellation). As a consequence the long-memory prop-
erty we discuss here is not the effect of inhomogeneous
trading during the day, but rather reflects the strate-
gic way in which traders place their orders. Finally, we
prove with statistical confidence that the long-memory
property of the sign of the order flow can be present also
at the level of individual trading institution.
3TABLE I: Summary statistics of the 20 stocks we study for
the period 1999-2002. The columns give the number of events
of each type, in thousands. All events are “effective” events
– see the discussion in the text.
tick market orders limit orders cancellations total
AZN 652 2,067 1,454 4,173
BA 381 950 598 1,929
BAA 226 683 487 1,397
BLT 297 825 557 1,679
BOOT 246 711 501 1,458
BSY 404 1,120 726 2,250
DGE 527 1,329 854 2,709
GUS 244 734 518 1,496
HG. 228 676 472 1,377
LLOY 723 1,664 1,020 3,407
PRU 448 1,227 821 2,496
PSON 373 1,063 734 2,170
RIO 381 1,122 771 2,274
RTO 276 620 389 1,285
RTR 479 1,250 820 2,549
SBRY 284 805 561 1,650
SHEL 717 4,137 3,511 8,365
TSCO 471 949 523 1,943
VOD 1,278 2,358 1,180 4,817
WPP 399 1,151 780 2,330
total 9,034 25,441 17,277 51,752
III. DATA
In order to a have a representative sample of stocks
we select 20 companies continuously traded at the Lon-
don Stock Exchange (LSE) in the 4-year period 1999-
2002. The stocks we analyzed are Astrazeneca (AZN),
Bae Systems (BA.), Baa (BAA), BHP Billiton (BLT),
Boots Group (BOOT), British Sky Broadcasting Group
(BSY), Diageo (DGE), Gus (GUS), Hilton Group (HG.),
Lloyds Tsb Group (LLOY), Prudential (PRU), Pear-
son (PSON), Rio Tinto (RIO), Rentokil Initial (RTO),
Reuters Group (RTR), Sainsbury (SBRY), Shell Trans-
port & Trading Co. (SHEL), Tesco (TSCO), Vodafone
Group (VOD), and WPP Group (WPP). Table I gives
a summary of the number of different events for the 20
stocks.
The London Stock Exchange consists of two markets,
the electronic (SETS) exchange, and the upstairs market.
We study only the electronic exchange. The data set we
analyze contains every action by every institution partic-
ipating in this exchange. In 1999 the electronic exchange
contains roughly 57% percent of the order flow for a typ-
ical stock, and in 2002 roughly 62% percent. It is thus
always a substantial fraction of the total order flow, and
is believed to be the dominant mechanism for price for-
mation. There are several types of orders allowed by the
exchange, with names such as “fill or kill” and “execute
or eliminate”. To place our analysis in more useful terms
we label events in terms of their net effect on the limit
order book. We label any component of an order that
results in an immediate transaction an effective market
order, and any component of an order that leaves a limit
order sitting in the book an effective limit order. A single
order may result in multiple effective orders. For exam-
ple, consider a crossing limit order, i.e. a limit order
whose limit price crosses the opposing best price quote.
The part of the order that results in an immediate trans-
action is counted as an effective market order, while the
remaining non-transacted part (if any) is counted as an
effective limit order. We will call anyone who places ef-
fective market orders a liquidity taker, and anyone who
places effective limit orders a liquidity provider.
We will also lump together any event that results in a
queued limit order being removed without a transaction,
and refer to such an event as a cancellation. Henceforth
dropping the modifier “effective”, we can then classify
events as one of three types: market order, limit or-
der and cancellation. For the set of 20 stocks described
above there is a total of roughly 9 million market or-
ders, 25 million limit orders and 17 million cancellations.
Throughout this paper, unless otherwise specified, we use
the number of effective events as a measure of time, which
we call event time. We typically do this in terms of the
number of events of a given type, e.g. if we are study-
ing market orders we measure event time in terms of the
number of market orders, and if we are studying limit
orders we measure event time in terms of the number of
limit orders.
Trading begins each day with an opening auction.
There is a period leading up to the opening auction in
which orders are placed but no transactions take place.
The market is then cleared and for the remainder of the
day (except for occasional exceptional periods) there is a
continuous auction. We remove all data associated with
the opening auction, and analyze only orders placed dur-
ing the continuous auction.
An analysis of the limit order placement shows that
in our dataset approximately 35% of the effective limit
orders are placed behind the best price (i.e. inside the
book), 33% are placed at the best price, and 32% are
placed inside the spread. This is roughly true for all
the stocks except for SHEL, for which the percentages
are 71%, 18% and 11%, respectively. Moreover for all
the stocks the properties of buy and sell limit orders are
approximately the same.
In our dataset cancellation occurs roughly 32% of the
time at the best price and 68% of the time inside the
book. This is quite consistent across stocks and between
the cancellation of buy and sell limit orders. As for the
case of the placement of limit orders, the only significant
deviation is SHEL, for which the percentages are 14%
and 86%.
In the following price will indicate the mid price, i.e.
p(t) = (a(t)+b(t))/2 where a(t) and b(t) are the best ask
and best bid prices at time t, respectively.
4IV. REVIEW OF METHODS FOR
UNDERSTANDING LONG-MEMORY
PROCESSES
A. Definitions of long-memory
There are several way of characterizing long-memory
processes. A widespread definition is in terms of the au-
tocovariance function γ(k). We define a process as long-
memory if in the limit k →∞
γ(k) ∼ k−αL(k) (1)
where 0 < α < 1 and L(x) is a slowly varying function3
at infinity. The degree of long-memory is given by the
exponent α; the smaller α, the longer the memory.
Long-memory is also discussed in terms of the Hurst
exponent H , which is simply related to α. For a long-
memory process H = 1 − α/2 or α = 2 − 2H . Short-
memory processes haveH = 1/2, and the autocorrelation
function decays faster than k−1. A positively correlated
long-memory process is characterized by a Hurst expo-
nent in the interval (0.5, 1). The use of the Hurst expo-
nent is motivated by the relationship to diffusion proper-
ties of the integrated process. For normal diffusion, where
by definition the increments do not display long-memory,
the standard deviation asymptotically increases as t1/2,
whereas for diffusion processes with long-memory incre-
ments, the standard deviation asymptotically increases
as tHL(t), with 1/2 < H < 1, and L(t) a slow-varying
function.
Yet another equivalent definition of long-memory de-
pendence can be given in terms of the behavior of the
spectral density for low frequencies. A long-memory pro-
cess has a spectral density which diverges for low frequen-
cies as
g(f) ≃ f1−2HL(f), (2)
where f is the frequency, and L(f) is a slowly varying
function in the limit f → 0. This follows immediately
from the fact that the autocorrelation and the spectral
density are Fourier transforms of each other.
B. Statistical tests for long-memory
The empirical determination of the long-memory prop-
erty of a time series is a difficult problem. The ba-
sic reason for this is that the strong autocorrelation
3 L(x) is a slowly varying function (see Embrechts et al., 1997)
if limx→∞ L(tx)/L(x) = 1. In the definition above, and for
the purposes of this paper, we are considering only positively
correlated long-memory processes. Negatively correlated long-
memory processes also exist, but the long-memory processes we
will consider in the rest of the paper are all positively correlated.
of long-memory processes makes statistical fluctuations
very large. Thus tests for long-memory tend to require
large quantities of data and can often give inconclusive re-
sults. Furthermore, different methods of statistical anal-
ysis often give contradictory results. In this section we
review two such tests and discuss some of their prop-
erties. In particular we discuss the classical R/S test,
which is known to be too weak, and Lo’s modified R/S
test, which is known to be too strong.
The basic idea behind the classical R/S test (Hurst,
1951, Mandelbrot, 1972 and 1975) is to compare the min-
imum and maximum values of running sums of deviations
from the sample mean, renormalized by the sample stan-
dard deviation. For long-memory processes the devia-
tions are larger than for non-long memory processes. The
classical R/S test has been proven to be too weak, i.e. it
tends to indicate a time series has long-memory when
it does not. In fact, Lo (1991) showed that even for a
short-memory process, such as a simple AR(1) process,
the classical R/S test does not reject the null hypothesis
of short-memory. This fact motivated Lo (1991) to intro-
duce a stronger test based on a modified R/S statistic.
We now describe Lo’s modified R/S test. Consider
a sample time series X1, X2,...,Xn with sample mean
(1/n)
∑
j Xj as X¯n. Let σˆ
2
x and γˆx be the sample vari-
ance and autocovariance. The modified rescaled range
statistic Qn(q) is defined by
Qn(q) ≡ (3)
≡ 1
σˆn(q)

 max
1≤k≤n
k∑
j=1
(Xj − X¯n)− min
1≤k≤n
k∑
j=1
(Xj − X¯n)

 ,
where
σˆ2n(q) ≡ σˆ2x+2
q∑
j=1
ωj(q)γˆj , ωj(q) ≡ 1− j
q + 1
, (4)
and q < n. It is worth noting that Qn(q) differs from the
classical R/S statistics of Mandelbrot only in the denom-
inator. In the classical R/S test σˆn(q) is replaced by the
sample standard deviation σˆx.
The optimal value of q to be used in Eq. (3) to compute
Qn must be chosen carefully. Lo suggested the value
q = [kn], where
kn ≡
(
3n
2
) 1
3
(
2ρˆ
1− ρˆ2
) 2
3
, (5)
[kn] indicates the greatest integer less than or equal to
kn and ρˆ is the sample first-order autocorrelation coeffi-
cient of the data. Lo was able to prove that if the process
has finite fourth moment and it has a short-memory de-
pendence (and satisfies other supplementary conditions)
Vn ≡ Qn/
√
n tends asymptotically to a random variable
distributed according to
FV (v) = 1 + 2
∞∑
k=1
(1 − 4k2v2)e−2(kv)2 . (6)
5This result makes it possible to find the boundaries of a
given confidence interval under the null hypothesis that
the time series is short-memory. When Vn is outside the
interval [0.809, 1.862], we can reject the null hypothesis
of short range dependence with 95% confidence.
Recently Teverovsky, Taqqu and Willinger (1999) have
shown that Lo’s rescaled R/S test is too severe. They
showed numerically that even for a synthetic long-
memory time series with a moderate value of the Hurst
exponent (like H = 0.6) the Lo test cannot reject the null
hypothesis of short range dependence. For our results
here we are lucky that we are able to pass the rescaled
R/S test for long-memory, but the stringency of this test
should be borne in mind in evaluating our results.
C. Methods of measuring the Hurst exponent
The determination of the Hurst exponent of a long-
memory process is not an easy task, especially when one
cannot make any parametric assumptions about the in-
vestigated time series. Several heuristic methods have
been introduced to estimate the Hurst exponent. Re-
cently some authors suggested the use of a “portfolio” of
estimators instead of relying on a single estimator which
could be biased by the property of the time series under
investigation (Taqqu, Teverovsky and Willinger, 1995).
In this paper we will discuss four widespread Hurst ex-
ponent estimators which we describe below. These meth-
ods are the periodogram method, the R/S method, De-
trended Fluctuation Analysis and the fit of the autocor-
relation function. We find that the first three methods
give reasonable agreement both in real and in surrogate
time series. The fourth method appears to be more noisy
and less reliable.
To use the periodogram method, one first calculates
the periodogram I(f), which is an estimate of the spec-
tral density.
I(f) =
1
2πn
∣∣ n∑
j=1
Xj e
ijf
∣∣2 (7)
where, as before, n is the size of the sample Xj. Then
a regression of the logarithm of the periodogram against
the logarithm of f for small values of f gives a slope
coefficient that estimates 1 − 2H (see Eq. 2). We make
our regression on the lowest 10% of the data (Taqqu,
Teverovsky and Willinger, 1995).
The second method is the R/S method (Mandelbrot,
1972 and 1975). A description of the method, which is
strongly based on R/S statistics, can be found in Beran
(1994). In summary, we divide a time series of length
n in K blocks of size n/K and we chose logarithmically
spaced values of the lag k = 1, 2, 4, 8.... For a given value
of k we compute the classical R/S statistics (i.e. Eq.(3)
with σˆx instead of σˆn(q) in the denominator) in each
block, by using the first point as the starting point. When
k < n/K, one obtains K different values of the R/S
statistics. Finally we plot the value of the R/S statistics
versus k in double logarithmic scale. The parameter H
is obtained by fitting a line to this plot.
The third method is the Detrended Fluctuation Anal-
ysis introduced in Peng et al. (1994). The time series
is first integrated. The integrated time series is divided
into boxes of equal lengthm. In each box, a least squares
line is fit to the data (representing the trend in that box).
The y coordinate of the straight line segments is denoted
by ym(k). Next, we detrend the integrated time series,
y(k), by subtracting the local trend, ym(k), in each box.
The root-mean-square fluctuation of this integrated and
detrended time series is calculated by
F (m) =
√√√√ 1
n
n∑
k=1
[y(k)− ym(k)]2. (8)
This computation is repeated over all time scales (box
sizes) to characterize the relationship between F (m) and
the box size m. Typically F (m) will increase with box
size m. The Hurst exponent is obtained by fitting F (m)
with a relation F (m) ∝ mH . The proposers of this
method claim that it is able to remove local trends due
to bias in the enhanced occurrence of a class of events
(Peng et al., 1994)
A fourth method is to simply compute the autocorre-
lation function and measure α = 2−2H by regressing the
autocorrelation function with a power law. This method,
however, suffers from the problem that the sample er-
rors in adjacent autocorrelation coefficients are strongly
correlated, and so this method is less accurate than the
other two methods discussed above. Thus, we only use
this method as an indication. Based on tests on real and
surrogate data, we find that the first three methods all
give very similar results; we use either the R/S method or
the periodogram method when we want to get accurate
values of the exponent α.
V. DEMONSTRATION OF LONG-MEMORY
FOR ORDER SIGNS
A. A quick look at the autocorrelation function
We consider the symbolic time series obtained in event
time by replacing buy orders with +1 and sell orders
with −1, irrespective of the volume (number of shares)
in the order. This can be done for market orders, limit
orders, or cancellations. As we will see, all of these series
show very similar behavior. We reduce these series to ±1
rather than analyzing the signed series of order sizes ωt in
order to avoid problems created by the large fluctuations
in order size; analysis of the signed series of order sizes
produces results that do not converge very well.
Figure 1 shows the sample autocorrelation functions of
the order sign time series for Vodafone in the period 1999-
2002 in double logarithmic scale. Vodafone was chosen
6FIG. 1: Autocorrelation function of sequences of order signs
for Vodafone in the period 1999-2002 in double logarithmic
scale for (a) market orders, (b) limit orders and (c) cancella-
tions. The lag is measured in terms of the number of events
of each type, e.g., number of market orders, number of limit
orders, etc. In each case the autocorrelation function remains
positive over periods much longer than the average number
of events in a day.
to illustrate the results in this paper because it is one of
the most capitalized and most heavily traded stocks in
the LSE during this period; we see very similar results for
all the other stocks in our dataset. The autocorrelation
function for market orders, limit orders and cancellations
decays roughly linearly over more than 4 decades, al-
though with some break in the slope for limit orders and
cancellations. This suggests that a power-law relation
ρ(k) ∼ k−α is a reasonable asymptotic approximation
for the empirical autocorrelation function. Of course, for
larger lags there are fewer independent intervals, and the
statistical fluctuations are much larger.
Estimating α from the sample autocorrelation using
an ordinary least squares fit gives α = 0.39 for market
orders. For limit orders there appears to be a break in
the slope, with an exponent roughly 0.4 for lags less than
roughly 500 and 0.6 for larger lags. There is a similar
break in the slope for cancellations, with a slope roughly
0.4 for less than 50 lags and 0.7 for larger lags. As already
mentioned, the sample autocorrelation is a poor method
for estimating α, and should only be considered an indi-
cation; later on we will use more reliable estimators. But
the fact that α is much smaller than 1 in every case sug-
gests that these might be long-memory processes. The
memory is quite persistent, as is evident from the fact
that the sample autocorrelations remain positive over a
very long span of time. The average daily number of
market orders for Vodafone in the investigated period is
approximately 1, 300, whereas the slow decay of the auto-
correlation function in Fig. 1 is seen for lags as large as
10, 000. This indicates that the long-memory property
of the market order placement is not just an intra-day
phenomenon, but rather spans multiple days, persisting
on a timescale of more than a week. Similar statements
are true for limit orders and cancellations. See also Sec-
tion VE, where we analyze this phenomenon in real time
rather than event time.
B. Statistical evidence for long-memory
In order to test the presence of long-memory properties
in the time series of market order signs both longitudi-
nally (i.e. analyzing a stock for different time periods)
and cross-sectionally (i.e. analyzing different stocks) we
proceed as follows: We consider the set of 20 highly capi-
talized stocks described in Section 2 for the 4 year period
1999-2002. Since the number of orders is different for
different stocks in different calendar years, we divide the
data for each year and for each stock into subsets in such
a way that each set contains roughly a fixed number of
orders4. To each set we apply the Lo test based on mod-
4 The number of market orders ranges from 26, 438 for WPP in
1999 to 415, 392 for VOD in 2002, the number of limit orders
ranges from 51, 798 in 1999 for BLT to 2, 552, 410 for SHEL in
7FIG. 2: Histogram of the statistics of the modified R/S statis-
tics Qn for subsets of the market order sign time series. The
original set of 20 stocks traded in the LSE in the period 1999-
2002 is divided into 324 disjoint subsets as described in the
text. The black region is the 95% confidence interval region
of the null hypothesis of short-memory. For 289 (89%) of
them we can reject the null hypothesis of long-memory with
at least 95% confidence. Similar analyses for limit orders and
cancellations give even stronger results.
ified R/S statistics, obtaining a value for the statistics
Qn. Since our time series consists of +1 and −1 we do
not have problems with the existence of moments. Fig-
ure 2 shows the histogram of the 324 values of Qn for
the subsets of market orders. For 289 (89.2%) subsets we
can reject the null hypothesis of short-memory processes
with 95% confidence. Repeating this test for limit orders
and cancellations gives even stronger results: For limit
orders, based on 468 subsets the short-memory hypoth-
esis is rejected at the 95% level in 97% of the cases, and
for cancellations using 558 subsets it is rejected in 96%
of the cases. We can therefore conclude that these order
sign time series are almost certainly long-memory pro-
cesses. This result is even stronger when one considers
the severity of this test, as pointed out in Teverovsky,
Taqqu and Willinger (1999).
We have performed a similar analysis for the NYSE,
using the Lee and Ready algorithm to sign the trades
(Lee and Ready, 1991). Despite some technical problems
associated with classifying the trades, it is quite clear
that this is also a long-memory process5.
2002, and the number of cancellations ranges from 29, 395 for
BLT in 1999 to 2, 259, 526 for SHEL in 2002. We thus divided
the market orders into 324 subsets ranging in size from 25, 000
to 49, 999; we divided limit orders into 468 subsets ranging in
size from 50, 000 to 99, 999, and we divided cancellations into
558 subsets in size ranging from 29, 000 to 57, 999.
5 The Lee and Ready algorithm is not completely reliable in clas-
C. Estimating the Hurst exponents
Now that we have established that these are long-
memory processes we determine the Hurst exponent H
to see if there is consistency in the exponent in differ-
ent years and for different stocks. Recall that for a
long-memory process the Hurst exponent is related to
the exponent α of the autocorrelation function through
α = 2− 2H .
The first estimator we used for the determination of
the Hurst exponent is least squares fitting of the peri-
odogram. The mean estimated value of the Hurst ex-
ponent is H = 0.695 ± 0.039 for market orders, H =
0.716± 0.054 for limit orders, and H = 0.768± 0.059 for
cancellations, where the error is the standard deviation.
The histograms of the exponents obtained in this way
are shown in Fig. 3. We see that in every case the Hurst
exponent is roughly peaked around the value H = 0.7
which corresponds to α = 0.6.
Following the suggestion of Taqqu, Teverovsky and
Willinger (1995) we also estimate the Hurst exponent for
market orders through the classical R/S method. In this
case the mean Hurst exponent is 0.696± 0.032, which is
consistent with the value obtained with the periodogram
method. Figure 3(a) gives a comparison of the results of
the two methods. In the inset we plot the Hurst expo-
nent obtained from the periodogram against the Hurst
exponent obtained from the R/S method, showing that
the results are quite correlated on a case-by-case basis,
with no discernable bias.
D. Idiosyncratic variation of the Hurst exponents
The previous results bring up the interesting question
of whether there are real variations in the Hurst expo-
nents, or whether they have a universal value, and the
variations that we see are just sample fluctuations. To
compare the longtitudinal and cross-sectional variations
we perform a classical ANOVA test. We assume that
for each stock i the value of the Hurst exponent in dif-
ferent time periods is normally distributed with mean
mi and standard deviation σ. We test the null hypoth-
esis that all the mi are equal. We indicate with Hij
the estimated Hurst exponent of stock i in sub-period
j. There are r = 20 stocks, each of them with a vari-
able number ni of sub-periods. The total number of
subsets is n =
∑
i ni. As usual the sum of squares
of deviations of Hij can be decomposed in the sum of
squared deviations within groups (i.e. stocks) (n−r)s22 =
sifying trades. Fifteen percent of the trades remain unclassified.
By random substitution of the sign of the unclassified trades, it
is clear that for NYSE stocks the market order sign is a long-
memory process with exponents similar to those observed in the
LSE.
8FIG. 3: Histogram of Hurst exponents for (a) market or-
ders, (b) limit orders, and (c) cancellations, for subsets of the
data as described in the text. In (a) we show histograms for
both the periodogram (continuous line) and the R/S method
(dashed line), while (b) and (c) show the periodogram method
only. The inset of (a) plots the results from the two methods
against each other (periodogram on the x-axis and R/S on
the y axis).
FIG. 4: Autocorrelation function of the quantity (nb(t) −
ns(t))/(nb(t)+ns(t)), where nb(t) and ns(t) indicate the num-
ber of buy and sell market orders, respectively, in a time in-
terval of length T = 5 minutes starting at time t. A lag unit
on the x axis corresponds to 5 minutes. There are strong
positive autocorrelations for periods of at least 5000 minutes,
or roughly 10 days, and no indication that there is anything
special about the daily boundary.
∑r
i=1
∑ni
j=1(Hij−H¯i)2 and the sum of squared deviations
between groups (r − 1)s21 =
∑r
i=1(H¯i − H¯)2, where H¯ is
the sample mean for the entire sample and H¯i is the sam-
ple mean for stock i. Under the above null hypothesis,
the sum of squared deviations within groups has a χ2
distribution with n− r degrees of freedom. Likewise the
sum of squared deviations between groups has a χ2 dis-
tribution with r − 1 degrees of freedom. Therefore the
logarithm of the ratio between s1 and s2 has Fisher’s Z-
distribution with (r − 1, n − r) degrees of freedom. For
all the three types of orders we reject the null hypothesis
with 99% confidence. Moreover in all three cases s1 > s2,
showing that the cross sectional variation of the Hurst ex-
ponent is significantly larger that the longitudinal varia-
tion, which suggests that the variations in the exponents
between stocks are statistically significant. Nonetheless,
it is interesting that these variations are relatively small.
E. Order flow in real time
We have shown that the sequence of order signs is a
long-memory process in event time. In this section we
briefly consider the correlation properties in real time.
This is complicated by the fact that trading is not homo-
geneous. There are both strong intra-day periodicities,
e.g. volume tends to increase near the open and the close,
and also strong temporal autocorrelations in the number
of trades. Thus the number of trades in any given time
interval of length T can vary dramatically.
To understand the long-memory of orders in real time,
9we are seeking a quantity that gives information about
imbalances in the signs of orders, but which is indepen-
dent of the number of orders placed in a given time in-
terval. We use two methods, which give similar results.
Let nb(t) and ns(t) indicate the number of buy and sell
market orders, respectively, in a time interval of length
T starting at time t. The first method follows a majority
rule, which assigns the value +1 if nb(t) > ns(t) and the
value −1 if nb(t) < ns(t). When nb(t) = ns(t) or there
are no market orders in the interval we assign the value
0. The main defect of this method is that it does not
distinguish intervals with small or large imbalance of one
type of orders. The second method is to use a continuous
variable defined as (nb(t) − ns(t))/(nb(t) + ns(t)) when
nb(t)+ns(t) 6= 0 and zero elsewhere. This is bounded be-
tween −1 and 1. In Figure 4 we show the autocorrelation
function of (nb(t)−ns(t))/(nb(t)+ns(t)) for a time inter-
val T = 5 minutes for Vodafone. We note that a power
law decay of the autocorrelation function fits the empir-
ical data quite well, with an exponent α = 0.3, which is
close to the corresponding value in event time.
This study makes it quite clear that the long-memory
properties of order signs persist across trading days.
There are 102 intervals of length 5 minutes in a trad-
ing day, which means that the last lag in Figure 4 cor-
responds to approximately 10 trading days. Moreover
the autocorrelation does not show any significant peak
or break in slope near lag = 102, indicating that the
long-memory properties of the market persist more or
less unchanged across daily boundaries.
F. Autocorrelation of transaction volume
We now show that the volume of the transactions is
a long memory process in event time; later on in Sec-
tion VIB we will argue that this is connected to the long-
memory properties of order signs via market efficiency.
The long-memory properties of aggregated volume have
been known for a long time (Lobato and Velasco, 2000,
Gopikrishnan et al., 2000). We use modified R/S statis-
tics in order to test the null hypothesis that the transac-
tion volume is a short memory process in event time. The
value of a stock changes in time because of the change
in price. Therefore one could expect that the number of
traded shares is non-stationary due to the non stationar-
ity of the price. For this reason we decide to investigate
the value of the transaction, defined as the product of the
number of traded shares and the transaction price. The
value is invariant under stock splits. In Figure 5 we show
the autocorrelation function of the volume of Vodafone
measured in terms of value in the period 1999-2002. The
inset shows a histogram of the transaction volume, which
is well fit by a Gamma distribution. Once we adjust for
scale, this seems to be roughly the same for all the stocks
in the sample (see also Farmer and Lillo, 2004). Moreover
this result is in contrast with what has been observed for
the NYSE by Gopikrishnan et al. (2000).
FIG. 5: Autocorrelation function of the sequence of transac-
tion values for Vodafone in the period 1999-2002. The trans-
action value is defined as the product of the number of shares
times the price. The lag is measured in terms of the number
of transactions. The inset shows the unconditional histogram
of transaction value in double logarithmic scale.
We applied the modified R/S test to the 324 subsets
used to test the long-memory properties of market order
size. One of the conditions for the applicability of the
modified R/S test is that the unconditional kurtosis of
the time series is finite; from the inset of Figure 5 it seems
that the volume distribution does not have a power-law
tail, so the modified R/S test is applicable. However
there could be biases in the test due to large fluctuations
in volume. In 303 of the 324 subsets, or 94% of the
time, we reject the null hypothesis of short-memory for
the transaction volume with 95% confidence. The Hurst
exponent estimated with the periodogram method varies
across subsets and the mean value is H = 0.732± 0.075,
within the sampling error of the exponent found for order
signs.
VI. MARKET INEFFICIENCY?
At first sight the long-memory property of the market
order sign time series is puzzling when considered from
the perspective of market efficiency. Long-memory im-
plies strong predictability using a simple linear model.
When this is combined with the fact that orders have
price impact, it naively suggests that price changes
should follow a long-memory process as well. That is, buy
market orders tend to drive the price up, and sell market
orders tend to drive it down. Thus, all other things being
equal, a run of buy orders should imply future upward
price movement, and a run of sell orders should imply
future downward price movement. The predictability of
order signs is sufficiently strong that one would expect
that profits could be made by taking advantage of it.
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There are many ways to define market efficiency, and
we should be clear how we are using this term. Here
we mean specifically linear efficiency, i.e. that the series
of price returns contains negligible temporal autocorrela-
tions. This allows for the possibility that there might be
other more complicated nonlinear patterns, and assumes
a trivial reference equilibrium that supports an IID ran-
dom price process. This is a strong notion of efficiency in
the sense of Fama (1970), in that the information set is a
sequence of recent buy or sell order signs, which for the
LSE is publicly available during this period in real time.
We will make a subjective judgement concerning what
we mean by “negligible”, without making detailed esti-
mates of transaction costs: If the directional movements
in price returns have long-memory, then the market is un-
likely to be efficient, whereas if they have short-memory,
it becomes much more difficult to tell.
In this section we explore the consequences of long-
memory in order signs, and show that its impact on the
predictability for prices is offset by other factors. In par-
ticular, the relative size of buy and sell market orders
and the relative size of the best quotes at the best bid
and ask move in a way that is anti-correlated with the
long memory of order signs, and compensates to make
the market more linearly efficient. While order signs,
market order volume, and volume at the best prices are
all long-memory processes, directional price changes do
not appear to have this property.
A. Inefficiency of prices in absence of liquidity
fluctuations
In this subsection we show that if liquidity were fixed,
the long-memory in the signs of orders would drive a
strong inefficiency in prices. We first construct a series
of surrogate prices assuming that the reponse of prices
to new market orders depends on order size but is oth-
erwise fixed. The relation between the volume of a mar-
ket order and the consequent price shift is described by
the average price impact function (also called the average
market impact function). Recent studies of the impact of
a single transaction (Hasbrouck, 1991, Hausman and Lo,
1992, Farmer, 1996, Potters and Bouchaud, 2002, Lillo,
Farmer and Mantegna, 2003) have shown that the aver-
age market impact is a concave function of either order
or transaction volume, matching other studies based on
time-aggregated volume (Torre, 1997, Kempf and Korn,
1999, Plerou et al., 2001, Evans and Lyons, 2002). It
appears that the average impact varies across markets
and stocks. For example, for a set of 1000 stocks traded
at NYSE (which works with a specialist) the impact is
roughly
E(r|V ) = sign(V )|V |
β
λ
(9)
where r is the logarithmic price return, V is the volume
of a transaction, and λ is a liquidity parameter. The
FIG. 6: Market impact function of buy market orders for a set
of 5 highly capitalized stocks traded in the LSE, specifically
AZN (filled squares), DGE (empty squares), LLOY (trian-
gles), SHEL (filled circles), and VOD (empty circles). Trades
of different sizes are binned together, and the average size
of the logarithmic price change for each bin is shown on the
vertical axis. The dashed line is the best fit of the market
impact of VOD with a functional form described in Eq.(9).
The value of the fitted exponent for VOD is β = 0.3.
exponent β depends on V and is approximately 0.5 for
small volumes and 0.2 for large volumes (Lillo, Farmer
and Mantegna, 2003). The liquidity parameter λ varies
for each stock, and in general may also vary in time.
Potters and Bouchaud (2002) analyzed a much smaller
set of stocks traded at the Paris Bourse and NASDAQ
and suggested a logarithmic price impact function. For
the LSE, Figure 6 shows the price impact of buy market
orders for 5 highly capitalized stocks, i.e. AZN, DGE,
LLOY, SHEL, and VOD. The price impact is well fit
by the relation E(r|V ) ∝ V β, where V should now be
interpreted as the market order size V = |ω| and β ≃ 0.3.
If one assumes that the price impact is a determinis-
tic function of order size, since market order placement
constitutes a long-memory process, the generated price
return time series will be long-memory too. We test this
conclusion by constructing a synthetic price time series
using real market order flow with a deterministic impact
function of the form of Equation (9), but with V now
representing market order size. We use β = 0.3 as mea-
sured for Vodafone in Figure 6, and arbitrarily set λ = 1.
For each real market order of volume Vi and sign ǫi = ±1
we construct the surrogate price shift ∆pi = ǫiV
0.3
i . In
Figure 7 we plot the autocorrelation function of the surro-
gate time series of price shift obtained with the determin-
istic price impact (upper curve). The inset of Figure 7
shows the same data with a double logarithmic scale.
As expected the autocorrelation decays as a power-law,
implying that synthetic price returns are described by a
long-memory process, in contradiction with the assump-
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FIG. 7: Autocorrelation function of two surrogate time series
of prices. The continuous line is the autocorrelation function
of the surrogate time series obtained by using the real order
flow of market order of Vodafone (volume and sign) and by
using a deterministic price impact of Eq.(9) with β = 0.3.
The dashed line is the autocorrelation function of the surro-
gate time series obtained by the real price shift due only to
market orders for Vodafone. In the inset we show the auto-
correlation function of the surrogate time series obtained with
the deterministic price impact in a double logarithmic scale.
tion of linear efficiency. The application of the Lo test
rejects the null hypothesis of short memory and the pe-
riodogram method gives a value of the Hurst exponent
H = 0.66.
There are two possible explanations for how the real
price series can be efficient when the surrogate price se-
ries defined above are inefficient. We have only used mar-
ket orders above, so the first possible reason is that the
price shift generated by limit orders and cancellations
act to make the market efficient. The second possibility
is that the assumption of deterministic price impact is
wrong and efficiency comes about due to fluctuations in
the impact. The first reason has been recently suggested
by Bouchaud et al. (2004). Their argument is that the
price shift due to a market order is anticorrelated with
the price shift generated by limit orders and cancella-
tions placed between market orders. We verified empir-
ically that such an anticorrelation does exist. However,
as we will show below, the market is approximately effi-
cient, in the sense that directional price changes do not
display long-memory, even when we include only price
shifts driven by market orders. Instead, we show that
efficiency is due to fluctuations in liquidity.
To show that efficiency does not depend on limit orders
and cancellations, we plot in Figure 7 the autocorrelation
function of the real price shift time series ∆pi due to
each market order i. We note that the sample first-order
autocorrelation coefficient ρˆ is negative. For values of
the lag between 2 and≃ 10 the autocorrelation is positive
TABLE II: Hurst exponents for the four stocks Astrazeneca,
Lloyds, Shell, and Vodafone, separating returns triggered by
market orders, limit orders, and cancellations.
stock market orders limit orders cancellations all events
AZN 0.54 0.54 0.53 0.47
LLOY 0.54 0.54 0.51 0.50
SHEL 0.52 0.50 0.43 0.41
VOD 0.54 0.50 0.51 0.50
and for lags larger than 10 it fluctuates around zero. This
is in strong contrast to the autocorrelation function of
the order flow, which is consistently positive for at least
the first 10, 000 lags. This makes it clear that the long-
memory of the order series has been strongly suppressed,
and suggests that it no longer exists.
In an attempt to test this more carefully we apply
the Lo test. However, this presents two main problems.
First, the distribution of price shifts due to market orders
seems to have a power-law tail with a relatively small
tail index (Farmer and Lillo, 2004). Therefore we are
not sure that the fourth moment of the price shift is fi-
nite as needed for the statistics used in the Lo test to
be valid. Second, ρˆ is negative and we cannot use Eq.
(5) to find the optimal value of q. Despite these dif-
ficulties we applied the Lo’s test to the time series of
price shifts due to market orders but we find inconclu-
sive results. Since we do not have an optimal value for
q, we calculated Qn(q) for different values of q and we
found that for some values of q, Qn(q) is outside the
95% confidence interval for the null hypothesis of short
memory, whereas for other values is inside this confidence
interval. A clearer result is obtained by computing the
Hurst exponent of the time series with the periodogram
method. The value H = 0.53 is very close to the value
0.5 expected for a short-memory process. In conclusion
the surrogate time series obtained with the deterministic
price impact is clearly long-memory, whereas the time
series of market order-driven price shifts is significantly
less correlated with a strong suggestion that it is probably
a short memory process. Similar results are seen when
we compute the Hurst exponent for returns generated by
limit orders or cancellations alone, and for other stocks,
see Table II. This shows that market order, limit order,
or cancellation-driven fluctuations are approximately ef-
ficient when considered by themselves6.
6 There is a slight tendency for the Hurst exponent of all events to
be a little smaller than the Hurst exponent of each type of event
taken separately. This suggests a cooperative effect in which one
type of event mean reverts against the other, as suggested by
Bouchaud et al. (2004).
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B. The key role of fluctuations in relative liquidity
In this section we will study fluctuations in liquidity
and fluctuations in market order size, and show that the
ratio of the two responds to changes in order sign pre-
dictability so as to make the market more efficient.
It is clear that the liquidity, e.g. defined as the λ pa-
rameter in equation 9, makes large variations in time. For
most purposes it is not a good approximation to treat it
as a constant. A study of the LSE makes it quite clear
that fluctuations in liquidity are large in comparison to
the volume dependence of E[λi|V ], and that in Equa-
tion 9 one should regard λ as a random variable whose
fluctuations are roughly as large in relative terms as those
of ∆p (Farmer et al., 2004).
We first show that uncorrelated fluctuations in liq-
uidity are not sufficient to ensure linear efficiency, and
then return to study the correlations. Consider Equa-
tion 9 and let us assume that the inverse of the liquidity
ℓi ≡ 1/λi is a random variable uncorrelated with mar-
ket order sign and size. In the previous section we have
seen that ai ≡ ǫiV βi is a long-memory random process.
Therefore if E(ai) = 0 then E(∆pi) = 0, and the auto-
covariance of price return is
γ∆p(τ) = E(∆pi+τ∆pi) =
E(ai+τaiℓi+τ ℓi) = E(ai+τai)E(ℓi+τ ℓi) =
γa(τ)(γℓ(τ) + E(ℓ)
2) (10)
Now ℓ is by definition a positive quantity and E(ℓ) > 0.
Therefore the term in brackets in the last line of Eq. (10)
cannot be zero and γ∆p(τ) 6= 0, i.e. when the liquidity is
uncorrelated with the order flow, the market cannot be
efficient.
We will define the term relative liquidity to mean vari-
ations in what is offered by liquidity providers, relative to
what is being asked for by liquidity takers. For our pur-
poses here, we will define this more precisely as the size
of market orders relative to the volume at the opposite
best price (e.g., the size of a buy market order relative to
the volume at the best ask).
Our working hypothesis is that market efficiency is
strongly influenced by relative liquidity. This hypoth-
esis is influenced by other work (Farmer et. al, 2004),
in which we demonstrate the following microscopic pic-
ture of market impact. There we show that market im-
pact varies, both because the depth of stored limit orders
varies, and because the size of market orders varies with
it. Market order placement and the volume (depth) at
the best price are highly correlated. It is very rare for
a market order to be larger than the depth at the oppo-
site best price (Farmer et al., 2004), presumably because
liquidity takers are reluctant to execute at prices worse
than the best price. When market orders do trigger price
changes, they almost always do so by exactly removing
the volume at the (opposite) best price. The size of the
resulting change in the best price is just the size of the
gap between the best price and the next price occupied by
a limit order. Thus, the market impact depends on two
quantities: Whether or not a market order is big enough
to cause a price change at all, and when it does cause
a price change, the size of the gap to the next occupied
price.
How can a predictable run of orders of a given sign be
consistent with market efficiency? For example, consider
a period in which there has been a run of buy market
orders. The long-memory implies that the next order
is more likely to be a buy order. Our hypothesis is that
this is compensated by the fact that the next buy market
order is less likely to penetrate the best price. This can be
either because the volume of limit orders at the best ask
is larger, or because the volume of the next buy market
order is smaller, or both of the above.
In order to test this hypothesis we explicitly construct
a model to predict the sign ǫt of the next order. We do
this by making an autoregressive model of the form
ǫˆt =
N∑
i=1
aiǫt−i. (11)
To fit the coefficients of the model we use ordinary least
squares. The values of the largest lag N vary depending
on the stock, but are typically the order of fifty. ǫˆt ≃ 0
corresponds to low predictability, whereas large values
of |ǫˆt| correspond to high predictability. We have tested
this and demonstrated that it works very well. When ǫˆt
is 0.5, for example, there is a 75% probability that the
next order is a buy order7.
We now test our hypothesis by computing the proba-
bility of a penetration of the best price as a function of
the strength of the sign predictor. (We say that a mar-
ket order penetrates when it is as large or larger than the
opposite best, and so causes a mid-price change). We
analyze this for buying and selling, and for predictions
that are right or wrong. For example, when the sign pre-
dictor is positive, predicting that the next order will be a
buy order, we compute the fraction of buy market orders
that penetrate the best ask. We compare this to the case
when the sign prediction is also positive, but the predic-
tion is wrong, in which case we compute the fraction of
sell orders penetrating the best bid. We repeat all this
similarly with signs reversed when the sign predictor is
negative. We bin based on the value of the sign predictor
and compute the probabilities for each bin. The results
are shown in Figure 8. We see a large variation in the
results. When the sign is unpredictable, the predictor
has a value near zero. In this case the penetration prob-
ability is roughly 58% when the sign predictor is correct,
and about 56% when it is incorrect (for both buys and
sells). But when the predictability is high, i.e. when
7 A more proper approach would be to use a model specifically
tailored for forecasting probabilities, but the quick and dirty ap-
proach above is sufficient for our purposes here.
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FIG. 8: The probability that the next order penetrates the
price, conditioned on the value of the sign predictor of equa-
tion 11. The cases where the sign prediction is correct are
shown as circles, and where it is incorrect as squares. Buys
are solid and sells are empty. The bins correspond to equal in-
tervals in ǫˆt. The error bars shown are standard errors, which
are clearly too optimistic given the long-memory of the data.
These results are shown for AZN; we see similar results for
other stocks.
|ǫˆt| ≃ 0.5, the situation is quite different. When the pre-
diction is correct, the probability of penetration is much
lower, roughly 48%, and when it is incorrect it is much
higher, about 61%. This shows that when predictability
is high the market acts to decrease the probability that
an order of the predicted sign will penetrate. This can
be achieved either through higher volume at the oppos-
ing best, or by smaller market order size, or both. In
either case, this is what we mean when we say that the
relative liquidity acts to oppose the trend in order flow.
We see similar results for other stocks8.
To test this hypothesis in a different way we plot the
expected value of the logarithm of the ratio of the mar-
ket order size to the volume at the opposite best, as a
function of the strength of the order sign predictor of
equation 11. This includes all events, whether the sign
prediction is right or wrong. The results for the stock As-
trazeneca are shown in Figure 9. Corresponding to our
previous result, we see that the ratio of market order size
to volume at best is larger when the sign is unpredictable,
and smaller when it is predictable. This reinforces our
conclusion that fluctuations in relative liquidity oppose
trends in order signs. Similar results are observed for
other stocks.
An obvious question is whether these results are pri-
8 The level of the penetration probabilities shifts from stock to
stock, but the basic pattern remains the same.
FIG. 9: The expected value of the logarithm of the ratio of
market order volume to volume at the opposite best price,
conditioned on the value of the sign predictor ǫˆt of equa-
tion 11. The bins correspond to ten equal intervals in ǫˆt;
the expectation is the average value in each bin. The error
bars shown are standard errors, which are clearly too opti-
mistic given the long-memory of the data. These results are
for the stock AZN; we see similar results for other stocks.
marily driven by changes in market order size, or by
changes in the volume at the best. We have done a
variety of tests for this, with inconclusive results. We
have seen some indications that variation in volume at
the best conditioned to the sign predictor is the dom-
inant effect, but the effect is only 1.5%, in contrast to
the effects above, which are on the order of 20%. The
problem is that there are large covarying level shifts in
volume and liquidity through time. Their ratio, in con-
trast, is not affected by such level shifts, and is a much
more sensitive indicator.
The other question one naturally asks concerns the
magnitude of price responses. Given that a market order
penetrates the best price, are there significant variations
in the size of the resulting price response? In other words,
are there asymmetries in the gaps in the two sides of the
limit order book that are conditioned on the sign pre-
dictor? Preliminary studies suggest that this is not as
important as the change in the probability of penetra-
tion.
These results suggest that the volume of market or-
ders and the volume at the best price are comoving with
trends in order signs in order to make the market more ef-
ficient. This motivated us to test whether or not these are
long-memory processes. Typical autocorrelation func-
tions are shown in Figure 10. These resemble the auto-
correlation functions for order signs, making it quite clear
that they are also long-memory processes. In presenting
the results in this order, we do not mean to necessarily
suggest that the long-memory of order signs is primary,
and that the long-memory of volume and liquidity are
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FIG. 10: The autocorrelation of the volume at the best prices,
shown in double logarithmic scale, as a function of time mea-
sured in terms of the number of market orders. The three
curves shown, from top-to-bottom, are the volume at the best
ask, best bid, and best price (i.e. the best ask when the order
is a buy order and the best bid when the order is a buy order).
All three are long-memory processes.
consequences of it, but rather to say that these phenom-
ena are intimately related: From the analyses presented
here, one could equally well say that the long-memory
of order signs adjusts in order to offset that of volume
and liquidity. The key point is that to enhance linear
efficiency, despite the long-memory of all three of these
processes, they must be in a certain sense out of phase,
so that their effect on prices roughly cancels.
We have not demonstrated that these effects are suffi-
cient to ensure linear market efficiency. Rather we have
demonstrated that they are quite strong, and they act in
the right direction to make the market more efficient. In
the conclusions we discuss some possible motives for this
behavior.
VII. INDIVIDUAL INSTITUTIONS
In this section we consider the behavior of individual
institutions in order to gain some understanding of what
drives the long-memory processes described above. The
LSE database allows us to track the actions of individual
institutions through a numerical code which identifies the
institution. For privacy reasons the code is different for
different stocks and it is reshuffled each calendar month.
Therefore our analysis will be limited to a single trading
month.
We consider as a case study the market order place-
ment of Vodafone in July 2002. Our choice is motivated
by the fact that Vodafone is one of the most heavily
traded stocks. In this month there were 45, 774 market
orders distributed across 155 trading institutions. We
TABLE III: Summary statistics of the 12 most active institu-
tions trading Vodafone in July 2002.
code number of market orders fraction of buy Qn
3589 6065 0.24 2.27
2146 3929 0.53 1.33
1666 3606 0.54 1.99
3664 3532 0.44 2.85
1556 3291 0.50 1.88
3007 3132 0.49 1.06
1886 2154 0.51 2.35
1994 1530 0.32 2.66
2196 1512 0.51 1.50
2681 1420 0.52 1.99
2742 1247 0.49 1.66
823 1200 0.41 1.59
have found that the 12 most active institutions are re-
sponsible for more than 70% of market orders. Thus,
the participation in trading is extremely inhomogeneous
among the institutions, with a few institutions placing
many orders and many institutions placing only a few
orders.
Table III shows the identification code, the number of
market orders, and the fraction of market orders that are
buy orders for each of the twelve largest institutions. In
Figure 11 we show the autocorrelation function of the
time series of market order signs for four active insti-
tutions. In panel (a) we show two institutions whose
market order flow is a long-memory process. One of the
two institutions (code 3589) is the most active institu-
tion, which placed buy market orders 24% of the time,
and the other one (code 1886) placed buy market orders
51% of the time. We see that in both cases the autocor-
relation function is well-described by a power law with
an exponent α ≃ 0.5, which corresponds to H = 0.75.
Panel (b) shows two active institutions (code 3007 and
code 823) whose market order sign time series is a short-
memory process. To test the hypothesis that the indi-
vidual market order placement is a long-memory process
more rigorously, we apply the modified R/S test to the
time series of the market order signs of the twelve most
active institutions. Table III reports the value of Qn. A
boldface font indicates the cases when Qn is outside the
95% confidence interval of the null hypothesis of short-
memory. We see that for 7 of the 12 active institutions
we reject the null hypothesis of short-memory process.
We repeated these results for the stock AZN in August
2001 and got similar results. Out of the top ten insti-
tutions, according to the Lo test, five clearly displayed
long-memory, and five did not.
This result shows that even at the institution level the
placement of orders has long-memory properties. This is
not true for all institutions, but rather there is an hetero-
geneity in their behavior. A correlated sign in the order
placement could be an indication of splitting a large order
in smaller size orders in order to maximize profit with-
out paying too much in terms of price impact. On the
other hand an uncorrelated (or at least short range corre-
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FIG. 11: Autocorrelation function of the market order sign
time series for four institutions trading Vodafone in July 2002.
In (a) we show two institutions displaying long-range memory
in market order placement. The top curve refers to institution
3589 and the bottom one to institution 1886. The dashed lines
are the best fit of the empirical curves with a power law. The
exponents are α = 0.47 and α = 0.51, respectively. In (b) we
show two institutions displaying short range order placement,
institution 3007 (continuous line) and institution 823 (dashed
line). In both panels the lag is measured as the number of
market orders.
lated) sign in the order placement could indicate different
strategies such as, for example, market making. In sec-
tion IXB we suggest and discuss possible causes of the
long-memory of order flow.
VIII. IMPLICATIONS FOR MARKET IMPACT
In this section we discuss a practical consequence of
long-memory of order flow. We have seen in Section V.A
that the market impact is a concave function of volume.
We may therefore ask about the price shift in the future
FIG. 12: (a) A decomposition of the average delayed market
impact of two successive market orders, as defined by Equa-
tion 12, for Vodafone. All four elements are conditioned on
the size V1 of the first market order. The immediate impact
of the first market order, E(∆p1|V1) is the continuous line;
the impact of any intervening limit orders or cancellations,
E(∆pi|V1), has triangles;, The immediate impact due to the
second market order, E(∆p2|V1), is shown with squares, and
the total market impact E(∆p1−2|V1) is shown with circles
(b) The average market impact for a series of market orders,
conditioned on the volume V1 of the first order, E(∆p1−m|V1).
In ascending order in the plot, the curves are m = 1 (black),
m = 2 (red), m = 3 (green), m = 4 (blue), m = 5 (orange)
m = 6 (cyan) and m = 10 (magenta). The average market
impact builds steadily with each order; this is caused by the
long-memory of the order sign and order size. both panels
show the results for buy market orders
(in transaction time) given that an order of a given vol-
ume and sign has arrived in the present. To be more
specific, let us consider a buy market order of volume
V1 occurring now. The generated price shift ∆p1 is the
difference between the midprice just after the order and
just before the order. Between this market order and
the next market order the midprice can change because
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of new limit orders and cancellations, generating a price
change ∆pi. When the next market order arrives a new
midprice shift ∆p2 occurs. The total price shift between
the instant just before the first order is placed and the
instant just after the second market order is placed is
therefore
∆p1−2 = ∆p1 +∆pi +∆p2 (12)
If the order flow were random we would expect that
E(∆p1−2|V1) = E(∆p1|V1) since the volume and the sign
of the next orders is uncorrelated with the correspond-
ing quantities of the first order. In Figure 12 we present
a decomposition of the impact of two successive mar-
ket orders in the terms described above. In panel (a) of
Figure 12 we show the four quantities E(∆p1|V1) (the
same quantity shown in Fig. 6), E(∆pi|V1), E(∆p2|V1)
and E(∆p1−2|V1). We see that E(∆pi|V1) is almost zero,
meaning that the price shift due to limit orders and can-
cellations after a market order is relatively unimportant.
This result suggests that the role of price reversion due to
limit orders and cancellations between two market orders
is marginal in making the market efficient. On the other
hand E(∆p2|V1) is clearly positive and increasing with
V1. This is due to the strong temporal correlation in mar-
ket order sign and size. In fact if the first market order
is a buy market order it is probable that the next market
order is also a buy and the volume of the second market
order is correlated with the first one. Therefore it is more
probable that the price will move up due to the arrival of
the second order. Figure 12 shows E(∆p1−2|V1), which
is simply the sum of the three terms, as shown in Eq. 12.
The distance between E(∆p1−2|V1) and E(∆p1|V1) is a
measure of the effect of the correlation of order sign and
size in the delayed price impact.
To extend this analysis to more orders, we study the
delayed market impact E(∆p1−m|V1) where m is the
number of future market orders. Panel (b) of Figure 12
shows this quantity as a function of V1 form = 2, 3, 4, 5, 6
and m = 10. We see that for a fixed value of V1,
E(∆p1−m|V1) is an increasing function of m. This is
clearly due to the long correlation of market order sign
and size. Eventually, for large values ofm, E(∆p1−m|V1)
becomes independent of m.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
A. Comparison to work of Bouchaud et al. (2004)
Now that we have presented all our results, we can
compare to the work of Bouchaud et al (2004). They
independently discovered the same long-memory effect
we have reported here for market order flow in the Paris
Stock Exchange. We have taken the analysis in a some-
what different direction than they have, and offered a
different interpretation. First, to convince potential scep-
tics, we have gone to extensive length to demonstrate at a
very high level of statistical significance that order signs
are indeed a long-memory process. This is separately
true for market orders, limit orders, and cancellations.
We have explicitly constructed a time series forecasting
model that shows the high degree of predictability that
goes along with this behavior – the conditional probabil-
ity of the sign of the next order is frequently as high as
75%. As required to ensure market efficiency, this pre-
dictability is not present in price movements. We have
hypothesized that this is at least in part due to anti-
correlated changes in relative liquidity, as defined by the
ratio of market order size to volume at the best opposite
price. This is large effect, involving variations in relative
liquidity of the order of 20%. This does not prove that
this is sufficient to ensure efficiency, but it does suggest
that time varying relative liquidity plays a major role.
Bouchaud et al. (2004) have offered a different expla-
nation. The key difference concerns the way in which liq-
uidity is treated. They assume a constant mean-reverting
propagator for market impact. Whereas we have studied
the way in which liquidity varies in opposition to order
flow, their assumption of a constant propagator amounts
to assuming that the liquidity is not varying in any corre-
lated manner with trends in order flow. Instead, they as-
sume that the market impact is time dependent in a way
tha causes much of it to disappear. They have pointed
out that the market impact does not grow as fast as one
would naively expect, and have presented evidence that
it often reverts on a long timescale, corresonding to a
few hours to a day. They propose that the key factor en-
suring efficiency is anti-correlated limit order placement,
i.e. that later placement of limit orders undoes the poten-
tially long-memory permanent price changes that would
otherwise be caused by market orders.
We have presented two pieces of evidence that seem to
oppose this point of view: First, we show that market
order, limit order, and cancellation driven price changes
are not long-memory, even when they are considered indi-
vidually. This seems to imply that correlated behavior of
limit orders is not the effect that cancels the long-memory
of order flow. Second, in our study of market impact in
Section VIII, we showed that the expected price shift in
the intervening time between two market orders due to
limit orders and cancellations is relatively small. It may
still be possible, however, that these small effects accu-
mulate to become important, as suggested by Bouchaud
et al. (2004).
At this stage it is quite possible that both of these ef-
fects coexist: While we have showed that time-varying
liquidity is a significant effect, we have not presented any
evidence that it is the only effect. It may well be that
there are diverse forces working to ensure market effi-
ciency.
B. Possible causes of long-memory order flow
We have shown that the sign of order flow, order size,
and liquidity, are all long-memory processes. What might
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cause this? In this section we make a few speculations
about the possible origin of long-memory in these funda-
mental inputs to price formation.
One possible explanation for long-memory in order
flow is that it simply reflects news arrival. Good (or
bad) news may be clustered in time, driving the sign of
order flow. Such news could either be external to the
market, or it could be generated by factors internal to
the market. If external it could be a property of the nat-
ural world, a reflection of the environment that humans
necessarily interact with. We know that the intensity
of floods, hurricanes, earthquakes, and natural disasters
have a power law distribution, and perhaps these are just
symptoms of a ubiquitous property of the natural world
that is reflected in what we consider “news”. Alterna-
tively, this could be an internal property, due to human
social dynamics. Such “news” might be internally gener-
ated, e.g. due to herding behavior (Cont and Bouchaud,
2000), or it might be caused by inattention: Time lags
in the response of investors to news arrival can cause au-
tocorrelations in order flow. However, it is not clear why
this should have a power law distribution.
A different explanation is in terms of the execution of
large orders, which leads to order splitting. It is well-
known that institutions with large orders frequently split
them into small pieces (Chan and Lakonishok, 1993 and
1995), spreading out the execution of the orders over pe-
riods that can be many months long. If such orders have
a power law distribution, and the time needed to fully
execute an order is proportional to the size of the order,
then this might give rise to power law autocorrelations
in time. The idea that order size would have a power
law distribution is not implausible given that many re-
lated quantities, such as firm size (Axtell. 2001), wealth
(Pareto, 1896) and mutual fund size (Gabaix et al, 2003),
have power law distributions.
We have tended to discuss the autocorrelation of or-
der signs as though this were a primary property, and
the behavior of volume and liquidity are consequences,
which must exist in order to maintain market efficiency.
An alternative is that this reasoning is reversed, and that
the autocorrelation of volume and liquidity are primary
properties, and that of order signs is a consequence. How-
ever, it still remains to be determined why any of these
should have such strong temporal autocorrelations. At
this stage we simply don’t know what causes this phe-
nomenon, but it is clearly a remarkable aspect of human
economic activity that deserves more attention.
Even if we take the existence of long-memory as a
given, we have not explained the strategic behavior that
ensures efficiency. While the correlated long-memory be-
havior of order signs, volume, and liquidity are necessary
to maintain efficiency, why are market participants mo-
tivated to make this happen? What profit-seeking or
risk-avoiding motives drive market participants to place
orders in such a way that order size and liquidity are
anti-correlated with runs in order signs?
To illustrate the problem, we will propose and then
critique a possible explanation based on market makers’
incentive to control prices. During a run of buy mar-
ket orders, which would normally tend to drive the price
up, market makers as a group are by definition sellers,
and their positions become more negative. If this is ac-
companied by a price rise they will tend to lose money.
To prevent this they might intentionally manipulate liq-
uidity to prevent or reduce upward price movements, by
supplying more liquidity at the ask than the bid. In a
specialist system in which a single agent has a monopoly
on market making this might be a reasonable explana-
tion. However, in a competitive environment such as the
LSE, where there are many market makers, this is more
difficult to explain: The individual who takes the lead in
controlling the price will experience the largest adverse
change in position. We know that on average buy orders
do tend to drive the price up (there is on average market
impact), so this behavior should systematically result in
losses9. This suggests that either the market makers as
a group collude to control prices, sharing the burden be-
tween them, or that this is not the correct explanation
for this behavior.
An alternative hypothesis that we consider more plau-
sible is that liquidity providers take advantage of trends
in order flow to acquire a desired position. So, for exam-
ple, consider a liquidity provider that wants to sell, either
to unload an existing inventory or to take a new tactical
position. When a buying trend develops, she takes ad-
vantage of it by placing larger sell limit orders at or near
the ask. From this point of view, one might reverse the
usual terminology, and think of market orders as pro-
viding liquidity for limit orders by making them more
likely to be executed. Under this hypothesis, liquidity
providers take advantage of an imbalance in market or-
der flow, thereby damping the response of the price.
One clue about the long-memory behavior of order flow
is that we see it for some institutions and not for others.
This might be caused by differences in order splitting
strategies. However, at this stage this is just speculation.
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